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ABSTRACT
The paper dissects the intricacies of Automated Decision Making
(ADM) and urges for re￿ning the current legal de￿nition of AI
when pinpointing the role of algorithms in the advent of ubiquitous
computing, data analytics and deep learning. ADM relies upon a
plethora of algorithmic approaches and has already found a wide
range of applications in marketing automation, social networks,
computational neuroscience, robotics, and other ￿elds. Our main
aim here is to explain how a thorough understanding of the lay-
ers of ADM could be a ￿rst good step towards this direction: AI
operates on a formula based on several degrees of automation em-
ployed in the interaction between the programmer, the user, and
the algorithm; this can take various shapes and thus yield di￿erent
answers to key issues regarding agency. The paper o￿ers a fresh
look at the concept of “Machine Intelligence”, which exposes certain
vulnerabilities in its current legal interpretation. Most importantly,
it further helps us to explore whether the argument for “arti￿cial
personhood” holds any water. To highlight this argument, analysis
proceeds in two parts: Part 1 strives to provide a taxonomy of the
various levels of automation that re￿ects distinct degrees of Human
– Machine interaction and can thus serve as a point of reference for
outlining distinct rights and obligations of the programmer and the
consumer: driverless cars are used as a case study to explore the
several layers of human and machine interaction. These di￿erent
degrees of automation re￿ect various levels of complexities in the
underlying algorithms, and pose very interesting questions in terms
of agency and dynamic tasks carried out by software agents. Part 2
further discusses the intricate nature of the underlying algorithms
and arti￿cial neural networks (ANN) that implement them and
considers how one can interpret and utilize observed patterns in
acquired data. Is “arti￿cial personhood” a su￿cient legal response
to highly sophisticated machine learning techniques employed in
decision making that successfully emulate or even enhance human
cognitive abilities?
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1 INTRODUCTION
The great advances that have occurred in machine learning research
in the past four decades have led to a rapid commercialization of AI
assisted systems, whose applications are nowadays indispensable
parts of one’s everyday life: Virtual Personal Assistants like Apple’s
Siri or Microsoft’s Cortana, driverless cars and smart thermostats
are only a few examples to a rapidly expanding list. An important
component of these applications is Automated Decision Making
(ADM), that is, the ability of algorithms to provide solutions in
tasks with ambiguous outcomes and determine the optimal among
a set of possible answers. In light of these developments, this paper
attempts to provide an overview of the various layers of algorithmic
determinism in automated and semi-automated tasks. Our hope
is that this analysis could serve as a useful point of reference for
assessing the frequently suggested arguments towards a potential
legal personi￿cation of software agents.
In 2016, Microsoft released an arti￿cial application into the on-
line social sphere: a ChatBot called Tay.ai, which was designed
to interact with Twitter users and learn from these interactions.
Within 24 hours, Microsoft had to deactivate Tay’s Twitter account,
due to a large amount of retweets of racism comments on Tay’s
feed, often including further o￿ensive commentary by the ChatBot
(Perez 2016). Although such racial commentary is not unusual on-
line (Williams et al, 2016), the case of Tay is of particular interest
given that it provides empirical evidence of advanced forms of AI
that is able to mimic human behavior. This interaction between
the machine and the human is an intricate process that includes
various degrees of automation, which in turn result from mixing
together the user feedback with the algorithm’s behavior.
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This of course opens the door to a plethora of ethical and safety
considerations with regards to using AI technologies without abus-
ing the power these might yield over human agents. When the AI
research ￿rm DeepMind was acquired by Google in 2014, one of the
prerequisites was to set up an ethics board dealing with these issues.
After all, the recent win of the company’s system AlphaGo over a
high level human player proves the need for a code of ethics. Lately
however, further concerns have also been voiced as to the legal
and ethical treatment of advanced AI applications that e￿ectively
require limited supervision or are even able to operate without the
need for “the human in the loop”. Indicative of the latter is the EU
Legal A￿airs Committee’s vote for a resolution in January 2017,
which calls for a detailed legislative framework regarding smart
autonomous systems. Among other points, the proposal urges for
a wider de￿nition of AI, including smart systems either comprised
a physical support or connected to a software program without
being embedded in a physical support. Largely based at a draft
report prepared by MEP Mady Delvaux in 2016, it is expected to
further discuss the prospect of considering rendering a “speci￿c
legal status” for robots. As noted in the report, "At least the most
sophisticated autonomous robots could be established as having the
status of electronic persons with speci￿c rights and obligations, in-
cluding that of making good any damage they may cause". Thus, an
electronic personality could also be applied "to cases where robots
make smart autonomous decisions or otherwise interact with third
parties independently". The purpose of this paper is to discuss this
proposition in further detail and assess its validity: are we ready to
introduce “hybrid” personhood rights?
The question of how real and simulated intelligence measure
up in AI is hardly a new one (for a good overview see Haugeland
1985). Note for example Chomsky’s reading of the Alan Turing test
(Turing 1950) as an approach that separates the cognitive from the
biological elements in order to provide an answer as to whether
machines can be perceived by humans as able to think, not di￿er-
ent to fooling someone into believing the “submarines can swim”
(Chomsky, 1996). This, Chomsky concludes, is a “question of deci-
sion, not a question of fact”, not di￿erent to fooling someone into
believing the “submarines can swim”.
This interpretation of “intelligence” lies at the heart of the argu-
ment put forth here: to legally assess Automated Decision Making,
one needs to go beyond the realm of biological and cognitive abili-
ties and consider the essence of the concept of “personhood”: what
de￿nes a person and when is a person autonomous? In other words,
the level of autonomy displayed by the agent or the machine will
also determine the level of liability, which is currently a puzzling
notion for legal scholars addressing AI. To highlight this point,
the paper uses driverless cars as a case study and explains how
fully automated systems bestow upon us the task to develop our
theorizing in order to accommodate arti￿cial agents within legal
doctrines. As it will be shown in the remainder of the paper, the
matter of “intelligence” in AI is not merely of philosophical nature
but its de￿nition is much needed to provide solid grounding for
emergent legal issues, such as tortious liability (Chopra & White,
2011). The latter is of course a legal convention, which provides us
with a safe tool to address challenging issues in automated systems
(i.e. liability in driverless cars) but is not on its own enough to
account for the recon￿guration of key concepts, such as causation
and responsibility.
Moving away from Chomsky’s narrow interpretation of the Tur-
ing test, Russell and Norvig (2003) draw an interesting distinction
between an artefact’s behavior and an artefacts pedigree: "we can
conclude that in some cases, the behavior of an artefact is impor-
tant, while in others it is the artefact’s pedigree that matters. Which
one is important in which case seems to be a matter of convention.
But for arti￿cial minds, there is no convention". This explains the
focal point of this paper, which revolves around the personhood
of arti￿cial agents. As such, our aim here is to go beyond the mere
con￿nements of torts and contracts and to canvass a rights-based
framework for highly sophisticated machine learning algorithms
employed in ADM. As it will be shown next, although to a certain
extent we do not lack the legal tools to address issues of liability in
automated systems, deep learning has added two extra parameters
to the equation that have complicated matters:
(i) The pedigree of the artefact is the result of an opaque com-
putational procedure to resemble human cognitive behavior that
is dynamic and evolving. Of course, automated systems as such
are hardly a novelty: take for example the UAV (unmanned aerial
vehicles), which have been in use since 1900s in military training.
The novelty here is that –unlike UAVs- the human involvement is
now from within the “black box”: a driverless vehicle does not lack
a driver but it is rather the driver that is not required to be fully
alerted or to participate at all times.
(ii) The behavior of the artefact is the result of a combination of
several layers of interaction between the human and the arti￿cial
agent. Again, the intricate part here is not the interaction with the
machine as such; for more than ￿fty years now, Brain Computer
Interface (BCI) research has been considering the applications of
such a symbiotic relationship in areas, such as neuro-prosthetics.
But what is striking here, is that the technological advancements in
Machine Learning have uncovered various degrees of interaction
between the man and the machine, which at times can be hard to
identify and rationalize.
To elucidate such intricacies, the following section provides an
overview of ADM and its mechanics, namely some related machine
learning algorithms and the current trend towards deep learning.
2 A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF EMERGENT
NORMATIVE AND LEGAL ASPECTS IN
AUTOMATED SYSTEMS: THE INTRICACIES
OF MACHINE LEARNING ALGORITHMS
The aim of this section is to ￿rst establish an understanding of
the technical context, within which ADM occurs. This will not
only allow us to explain better how a de￿nition of “intelligence” in
AI (pedigree) is somewhat elusive but it will also provide a solid
methodological grounding, given that the approach taken here is
a techno-legal overview of automated systems. Recent advances
in machine learning and computational complexity theory have
been further boosted by the ability to collect, manipulate and store
vast amounts of data. ADM is a natural product of these exciting
developments and has found a wide range of applications in seem-
ingly unrelated ￿elds like marketing automation, social networks,
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computational neuroscience, robotics, banking, transportation and
others.
Machine learning algorithms often employ arti￿cial neural net-
works (ANNs). This means that the computational units these al-
gorithms use to perform intelligent functions resemble biological
networks and neurons. ANNs take advantage of powerful algo-
rithms that are trained using large datasets available in many in-
dustries (image databases, security or healthcare records, tra￿c
or consumer behavior data, online platform analytics, etc.) so that
they can correctly decide upon suitable actions when new data are
presented to them in a similar way to what a human agent would
do; for example to recognize faces or operate driverless cars. The
purpose of ADM is to be able to act without the need of human
intervention. They are be able to deal with novel conditions, that is
take the right decision even when the dataset presented to them is
di￿erent from the one they have been trained on, e.g. a driverless
car should be able to navigate in a road it has not had access before.
How do ANN algorithms learn to perform complicated tasks
e￿ciently? Put simply, the answer lies in exploiting both increased
computational power and vast amounts of data already collected.
This data is used by the programmer to train the algorithm. Tech-
nically, training is often done in one of the following three ways:
supervised, unsupervised or reinforcement learning, see e.g. (Mohri
et al., 2012). These are technical terms that relate to the details of
the training process and are distinct from potential interactions
with the user after the algorithm is passed on to her in e.g. human-
in-the-loop and similar applications.
Supervised learning (SL) occurs when during training the algo-
rithm is fed with both an input and the correct decision (output).
For example, when the algorithm has to distinguish between faces
and objects in a scene, the input would be an image and the output
a class index, e.g. 1 for faces and 2 for objects. The algorithm is then
given pairs of images and class indices that are used to ￿ne tune its
parameters. The algorithm has to ￿nd the correct class index when
– after learning- it is presented with a new image that may or may
not contain a face (Nakajima et al, 2000).
Unsupervised learning (UL) is quite similar conceptually. Us-
ing the above simple example, the di￿erence is that the algorithm
would have to guess whether the image contains a face or not with-
out being explicitly given the corresponding indices during the
training process (Kumar et al., 2010). Of course, when designed,
the algorithm is fed with some information about the task, e.g. it
would know it should decide between two possible alternatives,
however it is not given which images contain faces and which do
not, it has to discover these di￿erences based on certain features
that the images might contain, e.g. eyes, nose and mouth at close
proximity in all images that contain faces. In a more di￿cult sce-
nario, the algorithm might even have to decide how many classes
or categories there might be in the data, something that might lead
to it over- or under-estimating this number. In such clustering or
classi￿cation tasks the algorithm puts together points that are re-
lated in some conceptual space. Of course, the dimensions of this
space (which features should be selected) are crucial for making the
algorithm e￿cient and are chosen by the programmer in the design
stage. This is important as it might introduce a bias in the output
of the decision process: depending on what features the program-
mer chooses to be important, the algorithm might take di￿erent
decisions. We call this the “bias” introduced by the programmer
to the ADM algorithm. The reader should keep this term in mind
as we will come back to it in section 4.2 below. Bias is not only an
issue in unsupervised learning but also in other machine learning
approaches like Reinforcement Learning to which we now turn:
Reinforcement learning (RL) is slightly more complicated: it
decouples actions from rewards and the algorithm aims not at
taking the “right” action (decision), but maximizing the reward
it receives (Sutton and Barto, 1998). This is merely a technical
distinction that renders the description of the relevant algorithms
slightly more complicated – for example, the algorithm might have
to take several actions one after the other to maximize an end goal
(reward). Interestingly, this decoupling speaks to the ability of the
algorithm to take sequential decisions that are related to each other
and think ahead in time; for example, the DeepMind algorithm that
plays the Atari game Breakout should ￿nd a balance between the
time it spends at each location ￿ring and the speed it moves if it
wants to accumulate su￿cient reward (high score) and successfully
proceed to the next level (Mnih et al., 2015). Furthermore, this
balance might change in time or as the level of the game advances.
Contrary to the other two approaches, the emphasis in RL is in
combining several decisions (or actions) to get the most bene￿t out
of them. In other words, reward is a complicated function of two
or more decisions that might be unknown even to the programmer,
let alone the user herself.
RL is today considered to be a promising avenue for building
intelligent algorithms that can adapt to di￿erent environments and
even tasks; an important limitation in older machine learning ap-
proaches was the lack of ￿exibility: e.g. an algorithm might learn
to play chess at master level but would be unable to play checkers,
which for most human players that know the rules chess would be
easy to pick up. This is why algorithms are often trained to perform
within a limited set of conditions and cannot succeed when rules
changes, even slightly. In a paper published last year, DeepMind
researchers showed that the same algorithm could perform well
in several Atari games without being trained in each one individu-
ally (Minh et al., 2015) Essentially, the algorithm learns di￿erent
mappings between actions and rewards online and is able to ￿exi-
bly maximize the bene￿t it receives when the environment (game)
changes.
All three learning approaches have a long history in machine
learning, however recent successes like the DeepMind algorithm
for playing Atari games discussed above followed technical ad-
vances sometimes referred to collectively as Deep Learning (DL).
For example, the DeepMind work uses Deep-Q Learning which
is a combination of RL and DL (Van Hasselt et al., 2015). Roughly
speaking, the term “Deep” here refers to increasing the power (and
complexity) of an algorithm by taking its basic constituent parts
and using them recursively, that is feeding the output of one part to
the other. Crucially, each part uses a similar learning process, how-
ever only after combining all parts together is the system (building
a deep architecture) able to perform well. If the architecture of the
algorithm is changed, e.g. a smaller number of constituent parts
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are used, then the algorithm might not be able to take the right
decision of ￿nd the action that maximize its reward.
Architectural details like e.g. the exact number of parts (layers) in
the system or how “big” each part should be in terms of how many
computational units should be used are often found by experience.
This is in contrast with older approaches and rule-based simula-
tions where the algorithms were implemented in much smaller
computer infrastructures and the role of di￿erent computational
elements involved was more transparent. Interestingly, it might not
be a principled explanation as to why certain deep (extended) archi-
tectures work and others don’t something often referred to as the
deep algorithms being somehow “opaque”. This idea has its roots
in neuroscience where a succession of brain areas – e.g. the ventral
system- plays a similar role to a deep network architecture. In this
setting, certain brain areas situated away from sensory regions light
up and respond to di￿erent stimuli e.g. some areas respond to faces
and others to objects. This means that these areas are sensitive to
the category of the visual stimuli and can distinguish between cate-
gories. Crucially, earlier (visual) areas would respond to anything
placed in the visual ￿eld regardless of its category. However, only
higher areas that receive input from several upstream regions are
able to distinguish between di￿erent categories of visual stimuli. In
brief, the brain decides about the category of the stimulus by com-
bining signals from several areas that interact in a large network.
Similarly, it is only after the programmer endows its algorithm with
several parts and builds a “deep” hierarchical architecture that the
algorithm can distinguish between classes of visual stimuli.
So what have we lost by making the algorithm deep? Maybe we
have found a way to replace humans with intelligent agents that can
performwell and take the right decisions; however, we cannot claim
that the algorithm really understands or interprets its input the way
a human would do. This poses an interesting challenge for law, and
in particular regarding the concept of “agency”, as deep algorithms
have the ability to act upon their input, e. g. take a decision. In
this case, the de￿nition of “act” is stretched beyond the narrow
con￿nements of conventional legal formalism; algorithms do not
serve as mere tools but are able to take well informed decisions
under little or no supervision at all.
Most importantly, there exists an additional dimension that fur-
ther muddles the waters for legally assessing ADM: what is the
scope for the user’s involvement in the decision process? Given the
complexity in the process of decision making, a clear understanding
of the interactions between the machine and the human agent is
necessary not only for attributing responsibility for the outcome
of the decision met but further to explore the causality, intent and
risk assessment. Take for example the law of negligence, a tort
introduced partly in response to the problems of agency: direct
liability would only apply in supervised systems, whereas indirect
liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior would require a
certain level of foreseeability, namely “normalized expectations for
the technical capacities of computer action” (Teubner, 2007).
In applications that require a human-in-the-loop like Brain Com-
puter Interface (BCI), assisted Decision Making and Health Infor-
matics the user already plays an active role in this process. In such
cases, the user acts supplementary to the algorithm and interacts
with it. This leads to increased performance and e￿ciency of the
algorithm and good performance even in situations of high uncer-
tainty or increased risk. What makes human-in-the-loop algorithms
di￿erent to autonomous systems is not the way training is carried
out but the possibility of human intervention at intermediate stages
of the training process. The human intervenes to enhance the al-
gorithm’s performance by bringing in knowledge the algorithm
has no access to. Intermediate training follows the general proce-
dures we have described above but the user has a decisive role in
selecting new training datasets that have been preprocessed by her,
e.g. throw irrelevant parts away or intervene at intermediate stages
to assess the quality of results produced and guide the algorithm
accordingly. For example, in (Awasthi et al.,2015) an algorithm used
limited supervision to cluster data in a certain number of groups
with the help of the user who at each stage told the algorithm
whether it should split or merge some of it.
Thus far we have discussed the technical details underlying
machine learning algorithms used in ADM. These summarize what
we earlier called the artefact’s pedigree. In the following section,
we focus on the artefact’s behavior and use driverless cars as a case
study to explore the various levels of automation: this allows us to
gain a better understanding of various degrees of human-machine
interaction, which will serve as a reference point for the remainder
of the paper and shall aid us in our quest to understand the balance
between the algorithm’s inner workings – that are often opaque –
and human intervention.
3 A TAXONOMY OF AUTOMATION LAYERS:
DRIVERLESS CARS AS A CASE STUDY
The prospect of fully autonomous vehicles “designed to be capa-
ble of safely competing journeys without the need for a driver”
(Department for Transport Code of Practice) has certainly gained
momentum in the past few years: Google Chau￿eur software cur-
rently tested in autonomous vehicles in California, Rio Tinto’s
autonomous haulage systems operating since 2008 in Australia
or Volvo’s pioneering program “Drive me” expected to release au-
tonomous vehicles to customers in Gothenburg by 2017 are a few
indicative cases of the great potential automated systems have
shown in the transport industry (Atkins 2015). This however is far
from removing drivers completely “o￿ the loop”, although many
manufacturers have already introduced semi-automated vehicles
with driving assistance features, such as controlling the brake, throt-
tle and steering, supporting active lane-keeping or using sensors
to deliver full speed adaptive cruise control (KPMG 2013).
It is thus apparent that automated systems, such as autonomous
vehicles, operate on several di￿erent degrees of automation, ac-
cording to how much control is yielded to the driver. In other
words, the novel element here is not automation per se but the
variety of degrees of interaction between the man and the machine.
Take for example the case study of driverless cars explored here:
automated driving is not really a striking fact nowadays; the auto-
mobile started replacing the horse-drawn carriages in the turn of
the 20th century. The initial skepticism towards the new risks posed
by the technological advances was followed by gradual adoption
of the new means of transport, mainly due to the codi￿cation of
automated driving in law (Moris, 2007). Transport related legal
issues, mainly liability, have been dealt with a dynamic body of
122
Towards a Legal Definition of Machine Intelligence ICAIL ’17, June 12-16, 2017, London, United Kingdom
regulations at a national and international level, which have taken
an anthropocentric view: assumption of risk, bad judgement, and
reasonable foreseeability, are a few grounds upon which causality
can be established. At the same time, they all have one common
point of departure: human error as a sine qua non of the decision
making process.
The elimination of human error is however also one of the key
elements behind the rapid evolution of the self-driving car industry.
A 2008 NHTSA report attributes 40% of collisions to “recognition
errors”, caused by distractions, and 35% to “decision errors”, such as
speeding. It is thus expected that removing the human element from
driving will enhance road safety (NHTSA, 2008). Recent progress in
computer vision like the use of massively parallel graphic process-
ing units and deep learning algorithms have led to a revolution in
the ￿eld of driverless cars. The quest for self-driving vehicles was
initiated with DARPA’s Grand Challenges: this was a competition
among such vehicles where external operators were allowed to
intervene in the vehicles’ route to minimize risk and ensure safety
(e.g. by stopping and restarting the vehicles). Since then, several
milestones have been reached and fully autonomous driving has
become a reality (Urmson et al., 2008; Levinson et al., 2011; 2014;
Wei et al., 2013). Of course, due to the complexity and breadth of
possible driving conditions, achieving fully autonomous cars that
have su￿cient training so that they are able to perform well in any
situation is far from solved (despite using huge training datasets,
that include millions of highway and road images etc.). However,
extending basic computer vision algorithms to the level of replac-
ing human agents is now considered viable and several reports of
self-driving cars have appeared in the media, e.g. (Rosen, R.,2012;
Hull, L., 2013).
Thus, it is not the technology or the externalities it unavoidably
creates that hinder our legal understanding of automated decision
making. What is challenging for legal minds, is an unprecedented
variety of interfaces and levels of interaction between the human
and a machine learning algorithm. To put it di￿erently, to fully
assess these algorithms one will have to perceive to what extent
the human element (directly by human-in the-loop interventions
or indirectly at the design stage) is present in the “intelligence”
demonstrated by the algorithm. As noted in section 2 above, it
is imperative that a basic taxonomy for ADM is adopted prior to
any legal evaluation to enhance our understanding of how each
“automated” task involves constant shifts of roles from executing to
merely supervising (Sheridan 1970).
The study of these interactions has given rise to many theo-
ries discussing ontological and deontological approaches regarding
automated functions and the degree of human involvement (Fitts
1951). As a result, many taxonomies of various degrees of automa-
tion have been suggested in a quest to localize informational control
in the human or automaton domain: Sheridan and Verplank’s ten
degrees of automation (1978) are probably the most widely adopted
theory that describes variations of control from human to collabo-
rative and to fully automated, Endsley and Kaber’s theory (1999)
emphasizes on supported, blended or automated decision making,
whereas Riley’s taxonomy (1989) uses a mixed assessment based on
various levels of autonomy that intersect with di￿erent degrees of
intelligence. These theories have provided the ground for authori-
ties such as the NHTSA or the Society of Automobile Engineers to
identify 5 levels of automation in computer assisted driving:
(i) No-Automation (Level 0), i.e. the system automatically as-
sists the driver to regain lost control of the vehicle.
(ii) Function-speci￿c Automation (Level 1), i.e. the system con-
trols one function.
(iii) Combined Function Automation (Level 2), i.e. the system
controls at least two functions.
(iv) Limited Self-Driving Automation (Level 3), i.e. the driver
cedes full control under speci￿c conditions,
(v) Full Self-Driving Automation (Level 4), i.e. the driver is not
expected to become involved throughout the duration of
the trip.
Further to this, the NHTSA Federal Automated Vehicles Policy
published in September 2016 by the US Department of Transporta-
tion, outlines in more detail the term “highly automated vehicle”
(HAV), which represents SAE Levels 3-5 vehicles with automated
systems that are responsible for monitoring the driving environ-
ment. This variety of human –machine interaction introduces a new
complexity: “the vehicle must be capable of accurately conveying
information to the human driver regarding intentions and vehicle
performance”, as well as to its environment, namely “other external
actors with whom the HAV may have interactions (other vehicles,
pedestrians, etc.)”. To put this di￿erently, it does matter whether the
average observer can tell whether a vehicle is autonomous or not,
as this changes the degree of reliance towards the ability of a driver
to maneuver and shapes reasonable expectations accordingly. This
is particularly interesting when one considers Level 3 SAE systems,
which are expected to be monitored by the driver, although human
capacity to stay alert when disengaged from the driving task may
be limited.
Driverless cars are a recent example where automated systems
have made great progress and reached a level, where the opera-
tor can be completely ignored. Earlier examples include aviation
(Spizer, 1987) and medicine (Thompson, 1994), leading up to the
emergence of the DoNotPay Bot in 2016, the world’s ￿rst “robot
lawyer”, o￿ering free legal advice to the homeless. We have chosen
to discuss driverless cars in the paper, as the various degrees of
automation discussed above, capture perfectly this interplay be-
tween the operator and the agent. As Sheridan notes “Automation
has moved from open-loop mechanization of industrial revolution,
then to simple closed loop linear control, then to non-linear and
adaptive control and recently to a mic of crisp and fuzzy rule-based
decision, neural nets and generic algorithms that truly recognize
patterns and learn” (Sheridan 2000). This in turn has also marked a
shift from automated ML (aML) to interactive ML (iML) (Holzinger,
2016), namely an almost seamless interaction between the machine
and the operator. The more sophisticated the system is, the more it
changes the nature of human performance, challenging thereby our
understanding of who the operator of a given task is, and to what
extent she needs to apply own cognitive capacities (Parasuraman,
1997). From a legal standpoint, this is highly problematic as such
interactions lend anthropomorphic traits to otherwise automati-
cally executed tasks. In a similar vein, Calo (2015) outlines three
distinctive features in robotics that blend the boundaries between
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the human and the machine: embodiment of the algorithm (e.g.
the car in our case study), emergence (the “coupling of complexity
and usefulness”) and social valence, namely the public reliance on
automated systems. Ultimately, he concludes that new juridical
insights will be required to fully perceive this emerging ￿eld from a
legal viewpoint and accurately evaluate to what extend automated
systems can be treated as social actors, able to “think” for us after
having bene￿ted from our social experiences. This echoes Teubner
(2007), who having reviewed Luhmann and Latour, explains how
most legal actors are created by social attribution, without the need
to possess any ontological human properties, such as re￿exive ca-
pacities or empathy. That said, arti￿cial agents are still beyond the
narrow con￿nements of our current anthropocentric view of legal
actors.
Can autonomous cars drive us, in the same sense that submarines
can swim? So far we have focused on how advances in machine
learning have led to highly sophisticated automated systems that
can potentially throw the operator out-of-the-loop. To understand
this better, let us take the Google driverless car as an example and
focus on how it can operate with minimal supervision. The Google
algorithm for driverless cars performs the following operations:
(i) self-localization using 3D map technologies
(ii) determination of static and moving obstacles
(iii) classi￿cation of information/objects by using machine vi-
sion
(iv) generation of road condition predictions
(v) evaluation of these predictions against real circumstances
(vi) automated actions like steering, braking or accelerating, if
required (Titiriga, 2016).
These are the same operations a human driver would have to
undertake; however the sense of agency is in this case di￿erent:
what do notions like “average reasonable person”, “free will”, “mens
rea” and degrees of culpability mean in the case of driverless cars?
Such questions present us with an “indirect agency”, a status which
is not easy to assess legally using frequently evoked criteria.
Let us then consider each of the above steps independently: in
operations (ii) and (iii) the algorithm has to perform image and ob-
ject recognition, segmentation and classi￿cation. Given the limited
degree of automation in the decision making process, it can be ar-
gued that these steps correspond to levels 0-2, in the SAE taxonomy
mentioned above. In other words, the algorithm has to ￿rst under-
stand howmany objects exist in its view and then classify them into
pedestrians, cars, tra￿c lights etc. This means that the algorithm
has to boost interesting parts of the image over not so interest-
ing ones; for example, be able to distinguish between a pedestrian
standing next to a still or obscure background, e.g. a tra￿c light at
a crossing or in a pavement with low lighting. Segmentation is then
carried out using some sensors (cameras, lasers etc.) that should be
able to learn new environments in an unsupervised way (Levinson,
J., & Thrun, S., 2014). In this context, recognition and classi￿ca-
tion of human and objects in the car’s proximity might go beyond
simple processing of visual input through the car’s camera and
applying labels to objects using a database stored in the car: they
might require autonomous interactions with electronic systems
and databases outside the vehicle like GPS-based guidance systems
and information from the Department of Transportation (DOT)
that would allow the algorithm to localize the vehicle and its neigh-
boring objects and surroundings (Zhu,J., et al., 2014). Furthermore,
information about the car’s location and other parameters (speed,
direction etc.) should be passed on to a central (global) guidance
system and database at a remote location, e.g. DOT so that other
(neighboring) vehicles might be informed about the car’s trajectory
and parameters.
Operations (iv)-(vi) above are more complicated and as such,
correspond to SAE levels 3 – 5 (see Figure 1 above): on top of image
processing and computer vision tasks, the algorithm of the driver-
less car has to solve an inherently dynamic problem where on top
of image processing the algorithm has also to predict trajectories
in time, both its own and neighboring cars e.g. predict the future
location of the car in the front given its speed to avoid collision
in case it breaks unexpectedly. It also has to generate appropriate
steering commands, breaking, acceleration and be able to associate
past and future driving conditions, e.g. if the ground map includes
information about a congested road coming up the algorithm could
look for alternative routes or try to slow down even though obsta-
cles might not be directly visible. All these operations endow the
algorithm with a novel sense of agency as it e￿ectively acts in lieu
of a driver and behaves like one. What are the criteria for legally
assessing this new sort of agency?
This question does not suggest that automated vehicles oper-
ate on a legal vacuum. On the contrary, the issue of liability has
been debated many times at a national, federal and international
level and although incoherent, most solutions suggested in the
regulatory domain move towards strict liability. Given however
the di￿erent types of driverless cars (re￿ecting various shades of
automation), there is no size that ￿ts all: Volvo, for instance has
declared that the company will pay for any damages caused by
its fully autonomous IntelliSafe Autopilot system. With regards to
Google’s car, the National Highway Tra￿c Safety Administration
(NHTSA) has recognized that the software, not the human, is the
driver. At the same time though, the international Vienna Conven-
tion on Road Tra￿c gives responsibility for the car to the driver,
requiring that “[e]very driver shall at all times be able to control his
vehicle”. The amendment to Vienna Convention, which came into
e￿ect in 2016, to include article 8 paragraph 5bis VC, does little in
clarifying matters regarding autonomous vehicles: as it is premised
on the assumption that such automated systems can be overridden
by the driver, it does not take into account fully automated systems.
Far from establishing legal certainty, the current regulative frame-
work regarding automated vehicles is still dispersed and in working
progress. At the same time, the issue of agency is barely addressed,
mainly due to the challenging issue of proving actual causation in
automated technology (Wittenberg, 2016). Next, follows an attempt
to understand the agent’s arti￿cial “intelligence” through the lens
of personhood – a doctrinal approach beyond the strict con￿nes of
liability.
4 DEEP LEARNING CONUNDRUMS: THE
EMERGENCE OF “ASSIMILATED
PERSONHOOD” IN ADM ALGORITHMS
At this point, let us pause for an intermediate summary: so far, we
have attempted to provide a descriptive (section 2) and normative
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analysis (section 3) of machine learning algorithms. These analyses
have validated the hypothesis set out in the introduction, that
ADM is a challenging concept for law because it rests on both the
artefact’s pedigree (see section 2) and the artefact’s behavior (see
section 3). These are two separate yet intertwined elements in the
process of mimicking human behavior. In the case of driverless cars
considered above, it was shown how human behavior reinforces the
artefact’s pedigree, while at the same time the artefact’s behavior
can occur without any human involvement.
Therein lies the heart of the argument put forth here: the un-
derstanding of what robotic “intelligence” is by legal scholars is
often limited; to this shortcoming one should add the increased
complexity of modern techniques like RL and deep algorithms in
AI that lead to a di￿cult conundrum; importantly, this conundrum
cannot be addressed purely with metaphors as it is often the case for
other questions that are new to legal research (Calo 2016). Earlier,
we considered di￿erent levels of automation in machine learning
algorithms and di￿erent shades of human agency inbuilt in systems
using deep learning. This led us to conclude that tools for legal
assessment that are currently available (e.g. Vienna Convention) are
expected to be unable to capture the di￿erent levels of automation
and human-machine interaction. For example, RL is often charac-
terized by an opaque mechanism of decision making: although RL
robots bear anthropomorphic features, it is still not clear to the
lawmaker how to deal with this emergent concept of “assimilated
personhood”. In this ￿nal part, the paper explores the necessity for a
new concept of personhood together with algorithmic transparency
in ADM and attempts to show how modern machine learning algo-
rithms like RL present us with new challenges that require novel
sets of standards.
4.1 Arti￿cial Personhood v. Simulated
Personhood: Focusing on “the loop”
(Gray 1921) de￿ned personhood as the quality of any entity possess-
ing “intelligence and will”. The idea that AI systems should be given
entitlements to personhood is hardly a new one: there is already
rich literature (Allan and Widdison, 1996; Kerr and Millar, 2001;
Chopra and White, 2011) that suggests that autonomous arti￿cial
agents could potentially be considered as entities meriting “legal”
personhood.
This is not the ￿rst time that entities other than a person are
entitled to the responsibilities and rights associated with the notion
of personhood. The concept of a “￿ctitious” notion of personhood
applying to entities other than human individuals has long been
supported by many famous jurists such as Von Savigny and Black-
stone (Dewey, 1925), and accounts for the nature of an arti￿cial
personality reserved for corporations (Hallis,1930), which is now
embraced in most legal systems. Not surprisingly, this ￿nds its
roots in the Roman law tradition, where the doctrine of “persona
￿cta”, served the purpose of distinguishing monks to monasteries
in canon law, avoiding thereby any structural de￿ciencies of the
latter: lacking in soul but made of individuals, who could still be
held guilty of delict.
In the early 19th century, the US Supreme Court in Dartmouth
described corporations as “an arti￿cial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of the law”, which displays in
fact certain personhood virtues, not as a person but as a “mere
creature of law.” (Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636
(1819). Since then, modern corporate law has developed a more
nuanced approach, acknowledging that these entities - being the
creation of private initiative and market forces- incorporate com-
peting interests that need to be accounted for (Kaeb 2015). In a
similar vein, robots and arti￿cial agents are highly automated sys-
tems that are equally premised on “private initiative and market
forces” and would therefore ￿t the criteria of “legal personhood”
as such. In the era of algorithms being the driving force behind
unmanned systems that could in￿ict harm, like military drones, it
is imperative not to a￿ord them “the blessings of perpetual life and
limited liability” (Rehnquist dissenting in Pellotti with regard to
banking corporations).
This proposition has of course not gone without criticism: auto-
mated systems cannot experience life as a good to itself given their
lack of consciousness (Aleksander 1994; Franklin 1995) and would
fall beyond the strict con￿nements of liability as a punishment
aiming at deterrence (Bentham, 2009). Such arguments however
oversimplify the way in which automated systems operate and do
not carefully consider the various levels of automation, as described
above. Solum (1992) has therefore disregarded these claims as purely
“behavioristic approaches” and has urged for a distinction between
simulated and arti￿cial intelligence. This would be a good ￿rst step
towards addressing some of the most complicated regulatory prob-
lems posed by AI: limited foreseeability of actions, operations based
on a highly compartmentalized and opaque design, and a narrow
scope of controlled tasks, are only a few examples that demonstrate
the need to fully grasp the contours of “intelligence” in AI (Scherer,
2016).
4.2 The “Intelligence and Will” in Deep
Learning: An Interpretation of Opacity
We saw earlier, that deep learning algorithms for ADM have an
intricate architecture, are often opaque and allow for various lev-
els of human-machine interaction and autonomy. In other words,
they are much more complex and less transparent than earlier
rule- based algorithms, however, this additional complexity has not
adequately been taken into account in their legal assessment to
date. We also suggested that such intricacies render the understand-
ing the concept of “personhood” associated with ADM algorithms
problematic.
Previously, we associated personhood with any entity possessing
“intelligence andwill”. A highly sophisticated and automated system
can be considered to possess “personhood” but in what ways is
the system “intelligent” and has “will”? Furthermore, the system
was designed by a programmer and might sometimes be in￿uenced
by the user. Both the programmer and the user have their one
distinct “personhoods”, so how do they interfere with the “system’s
personhood”?
We here propose that to address the above di￿cult questions
one needs to adopt a legal approach that will focus on both what
the infrastructure and behavior of the automated system is and
what the role of the human element (programmer, user) might be,
see also (Jones, 2015). This means that one needs to go beyond
older approaches that put too much emphasis on how (i) e￿cient
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(cf Citron, 2007) and (ii) objective the algorithm is (Zarsky, 2015)
without at the same time considering what the potential role of
the human in￿uence might be. As we saw earlier, this in￿uence
can be important for the algorithms output; for example, it might
introduce biases in the outputs of the automated decision process.
Dissecting the role of the human element is not an easy task, be-
cause, as we saw earlier, human in￿uence might be hidden behind
opaque architectures of the sort used in deep learning or might be
indirect in the case of human-in-the-loop applications. This might
be important for the correct legal assessment of liability and similar
issues in modern ADM: if one neglects the in￿uence of the program-
mer or operator, she runs the chance of not correctly attributing to
humans ￿aws in the ADM algorithms for which the humans should
be held responsible. Of course, the opacity of the algorithms does
not render this an easy task especially for legal scholars; however
only by taking a deeper look into the ADM mechanics could we
have any hope of properly understanding concepts like personhood
and liability associated with highly automated systems.
A good number of scholars (Pasquale, 2015; Citron and Pasquale,
2014; Crawford and Schultz, 2014; Zarsky, 2016) are currently fo-
cusing their critique towards the high levels of opacity and urge
the law to “open the black box of algorithms” or even set up a body
of independent auditors to carefully examine ADM (Sandvig et
al., 2014). In section 2 above, we saw that one important aspect
of this opacity that can perhaps be easily quanti￿ed is the “bias”
introduced by the programmer to the ADM algorithm: this referred
to some feature selection or similar process that crucially a￿ects the
output (decision) of the algorithm and which results from the pro-
grammer’s direct input at the stage of designing the algorithm. We
agree with the aforementioned scholars about the need to restore
transparency as a much needed ex post measure to eliminate bias
and evaluate human involvement and liability. Yet, we will argue,
opening the black box of algorithms only sees part of the picture
when it comes to modern ADM algorithms as it merely focus on
the algorithms’ design. On the other hand, the “intelligence and the
will” of the algorithm cannot be disconnected from its performance
after the design process (and training) has been ￿nalized: for exam-
ple, when the driverless car has to navigate in real world conditions
and interact with human agents (imagine such a car navigating
through a street ￿lled with other cars driven by humans). At that
moment, the algorithm has its own personhood, mimics human
behavior and perhaps continuously interacts with humans like a
normal person would do. All these are emergent normative features
that should be taken into careful consideration during proper legal
assessment of deep learning algorithms: we argue that understand-
ing the mechanics of these algorithms at the stage (level) of their
design is insu￿cient and should be supplemented by the study of
what the overall scope of human involvement at all stages might be
including training and unsupervised or semi –supervised perfor-
mance. For example, consider a driverless car that is ￿rst trained in
a racing track, then performs successfully in the highway and then
is assisted by a human when navigating in narrower streets. Is it
enough to merely study the technical details of the algorithms that
are used and also try to embed morality in their design? We argue
it is not, and suggest that the law should also attempt to de￿ne the
“intelligence” or “smartness” (Hildenbrandt, 2015) of the algorithm
as well as how this is a￿ected by the subsequent human in￿uence
(after the algorithm is designed and training has been completed).
5 FROM THE IMITATION GAME TO THE
VOIGT-KAMPFF TEST - TOWARDS AN
UPDATED LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF
MACHINE INTELLIGENCE AND THE ROAD
AHEAD
This paper has attempted to provide a normative and legal ground-
ing of the “intelligence” demonstrated in automated systems that
rely on deep learning. This is highly relevant nowadays, as the
technological advances in robotics and cognitive sciences have
paved the way to more sophisticated systems that can act and in
a completely autonomous manner. These systems demonstrate re-
markable abilities to mimic human behavior: this can be happen
in such unprecedented ways that interactions between algorithms
and humans can be quite di￿cult to predict, e.g. consider Microsoft
2016’s apology on their o￿cial blog regarding their Chabot Tay,
and its racist comments on Twitter. The law has therefore to in-
evitably adopt a new concept of personhood that will deal with
behaviors of modern human-like agents. This concept should go
beyond the scope of traditional (weak) AI and reconsider wha “per-
sonhood” might be; also, how personhood can be described when
human-like autonomous agents that act in an “intelligent” manner,
learn and evolve on their own interact with humans in real world
environments.
This unavoidably takes us down the treacherous road of pro-
viding de￿nitions of concepts like “intelligence”; a tedious task in
itself due to the relativity the concept bears. A simple question
that comes to mind when one ￿rst tries to de￿ne this concept is
the following: is it a concept that can be understood in terms of a
mechanism (or an algorithm) that generates certain (human-like)
behaviors or is it a matter of a human perceiving an agent (a human
or a machine) as intelligent? Although Turing’s original intention
in ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ was to explore whether
a computer can “imitate a brain” (Copeland, 2004), he then admitted
to be skeptical as to how the intelligence of a machine was to be
perceived: “The extent to which we regard something as behaving
in an intelligent manner” he noted (Turing, 1950) “is determined as
much by our own state of mind and training as by the properties of
the object under consideration” (see also Minsky, 1988 for a similar
view). In other words, Turing suggests that “intelligence” relates to
how we perceive it in a manner remarkably similar to how the legal
system operates: Turing’s “perception” of intelligence is akin to
the principle of “interpretation”. The legal system tries to interpret
human behaviors not to understand the mechanisms (algorithms)
that might have generated them; this might be one reason why
automated systems are not easily perceived in law and humanities
in general. To address these shortcomings, theorists have sought to
elucidate additional dimensions of machine intelligence, like con-
sciousness (Floridi, 2005), along the same lines of the empathy test
employed in Philip Dick’s ￿ctitious Voigt-Kamp￿ test (Dick, 1968).
Whereas intelligent processing shall always be opaque, it is desir-
able to go past the prima facie anthropomorphism of automated
systems and actually enhance our understanding of what their “in-
telligence” might be. Deep Learning for instance, might yield results
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that even the programmers cannot anticipate. We therefore suggest
that our perception of machine intelligence should be enhanced;
this could either happen ex ante (“at the input stage”) or ex post
(“at the output stage”):
(i) ex ante e￿orts could include monitoring or pre-
scribing the algorithm’s design features and prin-
ciples e.g. carefully selecting training data or ini-
tial weights so that they are consistent with legal
or ethical constraints (Wallach and Allen, 2008).
(ii) ex post e￿orts on the other hand, refer mostly to
the user’s interpretation and feedback after the
algorithm has performed an intelligent function
(taken a decision).
In other words, we should be able to assess the system’s perfor-
mance, i.e. the processing instead of simply reviewing the decision
met. This is also important as it places ADM within the socio-legal
context it belongs to. In this sense, it echoes Pagallo’s view that we
need to deepen our understanding of how this interaction works
in vivo rather than in vitro (Pagallo, 2016). Unlike Pagallo how-
ever, we suggest that instead of reserving de-regulated zones to test
these interactions, we might be able to assess risks (and thus draft
secondary rules) based on the performance as a means and not as
an end to regulating automata.
Machine learning has reached such a sophisticated level that
it could not only result in misrepresenting an automated system
that passed the Turing test as a human but importantly escape
liability due to the judiciary’s inability to attribute a concept of
“personhood” to the system (algorithm). What is suggested here is
not that we put ourselves in the shoes of the designers or engineers
to be able and understand a software agent’s action/result. It is
rather a matter of perception of its capabilities and context, as a
way of rationalizing “intelligence” in AI. This shall help us overcome
the issue of unpredictability as “the overall interpretation of the
SA’s behavior will be based upon the hypothesis that the SA is
operating “rationally”, by adopting determinations appropriate to
the purposes assigned to it, on the basis of the information available
to it, in the context in which it is going to operate, that is, such an
interpretation will be based upon the intentional stance” (Sartor,
2009).
This paper has sought to explore the challenges put forth by
the application of modern machine learning algorithms like deep
networks and reinforcement learning in the area of Automated
Decision Making (ADM), which merits further research and con-
sideration. We hope that our ￿ndings shall mobilize legal scholars
and ethicists to undertake the di￿cult task of further dissecting the
emergent normative features associated with ADM in the not so
distant future.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We wish to thank the anonymous reviewers, as well as Roger
Brownsword, for the useful feedback provided. Our thanks extend
further to Roland Vogl and the CodeX group at Stanford Law School
as well as to Helen Nissenbaum, Katherine Strandburg and the PRG
community at the ILI, New York University, for providing us with
a platform to discuss our ￿ndings. An extended version of this
paper appears at the International Review for Law Computers and
Technology – Special Issue 2/2017. Any errors or omissions remain
the sole responsibility of the authors.
REFERENCES
Aleksander I. 1994. “Towards a Neural Model of Consciousness.” Proceedings ICANN
94. Berlin: Springer
Allan, T., and R. Widdison. 1996. “Can computers make contracts?” Harvard Journal of
Law and Technology, no 9: 25–52.
Atkins R. 2015. “Connected and Autonomous Vehicles: Introducing the future of
mobility.” White Paper.
Awasthi, P., Balcan, M. F., and K. Voevodski. (2014). “Local algorithms for interactive
clustering.” ICML. 550-558.
Bentham, J. 2009. “Punishment and Deterrence.” In: Principled Sentencing: Readings
on Theory and Policy, edited by von Hirsch, A., Ashworth, A., and J. Roberts.
Oxford:Hart Publishing.
Calo R. 2015. “Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw.” California Law Review, no 103:
513.
Calo, R. 2016. “Robots in American Law”. University of Washington School of Law
Research Paper, no 99.
Chomsky, N. 1996. Powers and Prospects. London: Pluto Press.
Chopra, S., and L. White. 2011. A Legal Theory for Autonomous Arti￿cial Agents.
Michigan: The University of Michigan Press. Citron, D. K. 2007 “Technological due
process”. Washington U L Rev, 85: 1249-1313.
Citron, D. K., and F. A. Pasquale. 2014. “The scored society: due process for automated
predictions”. Washington Law Review, no 89.
Crawford, K., and J. Schultz. 2014. “Big data and due process: Toward a framework to
redress predictive privacy harms.” BCL Reviews, no 55: 93.
Dewey, J., 1925. The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality,Yale LJ 35:655.
Dick, Ph., 1968. Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep. Bowling Green: Bowling Green.
Endsley, M. R., and D.B. Kaber. 1999. “Level of automation e￿ects on performance,
situation awareness and workload in a dynamic control task.” Ergonomics 42(3):
462
Fitts, P. 1951. “Human engineering for an e￿ective air-navigation and tra￿c-control
system.” Washington: National Research Council, Division of Anthropology and
Psychology.
Floridi, L. 2005. “Consciousness, agents and the knowledge game”. Minds and machines
15(3–4): 415– 444. Franklin, S. 1995. Arti￿cial Minds. Boston, MA: MIT Press.
Gray, J. 1921. The Nature and Sources of the Law. London: Macmillan. Hallis, F.,
1930. Corporate personality: a study in jurisprudence: Oxford University Press, H.
Milford.
Haugeland, J. 1985. Arti￿cial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Hildenbrandt, M. 2015. Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law. Cheltenham, UK;
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
Holzinger, A. 2016. “Interactive machine learning for health informatics: when do we
need the human-in-the-loop?” Brain Informatics, no 3:119-131.
Copeland, J. 2014. The Essential Turing: Seminal Writings in Computing, Logic, Phi-
losophy, Arti￿cial Intelligence, and Arti￿cial Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jones, M. 2015. “Ironies of Automation Law: Tying Policy Knots with Fair Automation
Practices Principles.” Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L., no 18: 77.
Kaeb, C. 2015. “Putting the ‘Corporate’ back into corporate personhood.” Northwestern
Journal of International Law and Business 35(3).
Kerr I. 2001. “Ensuring the success of contract formation in agent mediated electronic
commerce.” Electronic Commerce Research 1: 183–202.
Kumar, D., Rai, C. S., and S. Kumar, S. 2010. “Analysis of unsupervised learning tech-
niques for face recognition.” International Journal of Imaging Systems and Tech-
nology, 20(3): 261-267.
Levinson, J., and S. Thrun. 2014. “Unsupervised calibration for multi-beam lasers.” In:
Experimental Robotics. Berlin: Springer.
Levinson, J., Askeland, J., Becker, J., Dolson, J., Held, D., Kammel, S., and M. Sokolsky.
2011. “Towards fully autonomous driving: Systems and algorithms.” In: Intelligent
Vehicles Symposium, IEEE.
Minsky, M. 1988. The Society of Mind” London: Pan Books.
Microsoft’s O￿cial Blog.2016. “Learning from Tay’s Introduction.”
http://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2016/03/25/learning-tays-introduction/
Mnih, V., Kavukcuoglu, K., Silver, D., Rusu, A. A., Veness, J., Bellemare, M. G., and S.
Petersen. 2015. “Human-level control through deep reinforcement learning.” Nature,
518 (7540), 529-533.
Mohri, M., Rostamizadeh, A., & Talwalkar, A. (2012). Foundations of machine learning.
MIT press.
Moris, E. 2007. “From Horse Power to Horsepower.” Access Magazine 1(30). Nakajima,
C., Pontil, M., Heisele, B., and T. Poggio. (2000). “People recognition in image se-
quences by supervised learning.” MIT Report. Cambridge MA, Center for Biological
and Computational Learning.
National Highway Tra￿c Safety Administration.2008. “National
Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey: Report to Congress.”
http://www.nrdnhtsa.dot/gov/pubs/811059.pdf
127
ICAIL ’17, June 12-16, 2017, London, United Kingdom Argyro Karanasiou and Dimitris Pinotsis
Pagallo, U, 2016. “Even Angels Need the Rules:AI, Roboethics, and the Law”, in Gal
A. Kaminka et al. (eds.), Frontiers in Arti￿cial Intelligence and Applications, IOS
Press, Amsterdam, pp. 209-215.
Parasuraman R, 1997. “Humans and Automation: Use, Misuse, Disuse, Abuse”, Human
Factors 37 (2):230-253
Pasquale, F. 2015. The black box society: The secret algorithms that control money
and information. Harvard University Press.
Perez, S (2016, March), “Microsoft Silences its new A.I. bot Tay, after Twitter users
teach it Racism”. https://techcrunch.com/2016/03/24/microsoft-silences-its-new-a-
ibot-tay-after-twitter-users-teach-it-racism/ (retrieved 12/08/2016)
Riley, V. 1989. “A general model of mixed-initiative human-machine systems.” Proceed-
ings of the Human Factors Society, no 33: 124-128.
Rosen, R. 2012. "Google’s Self-Driving Cars: 300,000Miles Logged, Not a Single Accident
Under Computer Control." The Atlantic.
Russell, S J. and P. Norvig. 2003. Arti￿cial Intelligence: A Modern Approach. New
Jersey: Prentice Hall.
SAE International. 2014. Surface Vehicle Information Report, J3016: Taxonomy and
De￿nitions for Terms Related to On-Road Motor Vehicle Automated Driving Sys-
tems.
Sandvig, C., et al. 2014. “Auditing algorithms: Research methods for detecting dis-
crimination on internet platforms.” Data and Discrimination: Converting Critical
Concerns into Productive Inquiry.
Sartor. G. 2009. Cognitive automata and the law: Electronic contracting and the inten-
tionality of software agents. Arti￿cial Intelligence and Law 17(4): 253–290
Scherer, M. 2016. “Regulating Arti￿cial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Com-
petencies, and Strategies” Harvard Journal of Law & Tech, Vol 29 (2):354,359.
Sheridan, T. 1970. “On how often the supervisor should sample.” IEEE Transactions on
Systems Science and Cybernetics. SSC-6: 140-145.
Sheridan, T. (2000). “Function allocation: algorithm, alchemy of apostasy?” Interna-
tional Journal of Human Computer Studies 5(2):205.
Sheridan, T. B., and W.L. Verplank. 1978. Human and computer control of undersea
teleoperators. Arlington: O￿ce of Naval Research.
Silberg, G., Manassa, M., Everhart, K., Subramanian, D., Corley, M., Fraser, H., and
V. Sinha. 2013. “Self-Driving Cars: Are We Ready.” White paper KPMG. Spitzer, C
R.1987. Digital Avionics Systems, Englewood Cli￿s, NJ Prentice Hall.
Solum, L. B. 1992. “Legal personhood for arti￿cial intelligence.” North Carolina Law
Review, no 70: 1231.
Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (1998). Reinforcement learning: An introduction (Vol. 1,
No. 1). Cambridge: MIT press.
Teubner, G. 2007. “Rights of Non Humans? Electronic Agents and Animals as New
Actors in Politics and Law.” In: Lecture delivered on 17th January 2007 – MaxWeber
Programme, European University Institute.
Thompson J M. 1994. “Medical Decision Making and Automation”, in Mouloua, M.
and Parasuraman, R. (eds) Human Performance in Automated Systems: Current
Research and Trends, Hillsdale, NJ:Erlbaum.
Titiriga, R. 2016. “Autonomy of Military Robots: Assessing the Technical and Legal
(’Jus in Bello’) Thresholds.” The John Marshall Journal of Information Technology
& Privacy Law 32(2): 57-88.
Trimble, T. E., Bishop, R., Morgan, J. F., and M. Blanco. 2014. Human factors eval-
uation of level 2 and level 3 automated driving concepts: Past research, state of
automation technology, and emerging system concepts. Report No. DOT HS 812
043. Washington, DC: National Highway Tra￿c Safety Administration.
Turing, A. 1950. “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, Mind, New Series, 59 (236):
433-460.
Urmson, C., Anhalt, J., Bagnell, D., Baker, C., Bittner, R., Clark, M. N., and M. Gittleman.
2008. Autonomous driving in urban environments: Boss and the urban challenge.
Journal of Field Robotics 25(8): 425-466.
Van Hasselt, H., Guez, A., and D. Silver. 2015. Deep reinforcement learning with double
Q-learning. CoRR, abs/1509.06461.
Wallach W, and Allen, C. 2008. Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong,
Oxford University Press.
Wei, J., Snider, J. M., Kim, J., Dolan, J. M., Rajkumar, R., & Litkouhi, B. 2013. Towards a
viable autonomous driving research platform. In: Intelligent Vehicles Symposium.
Williams A., Oliver C., Aumer K. and Ch. Meyers. 2016. “Racial Microaggressions and
perceptions of Internet memes.” Computers in Human Behavior 63: 424-432.
Wilson, A., Fern, A., Ray, S., and P. Tadepalli. 2007. “Multi-task reinforcement learn-
ing: a hierarchical Bayesian approach.” In: Proceedings of the 24th international
conference on Machine learning.
Wittenberg, S. 2016. “Automated Vehicles: Strict Products Liability, Negligence Liability
and Proliferation”, Illinois Business L J
Zarsky, T. 2016. “The trouble with algorithmic decisions an analytic road map to
examine e￿ciency and fairness in automated and opaque decision making.” Science,
Technology & Human Values 41(1): 118-132.
Zhu, J., Montemerlo, M. S., Urmson, C. P., and A. Chatham. 2014. U.S. Patent No.
8,874,372. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and Trademark O￿ce.
128
